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Introduction
For years, economists have debated the respective merits of income and consumption bases for taxation. The United States uses
consumption-based taxes far less than most other developed
Western nations. In 1985, the 23 members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development obtained an average 30
percent of their revenue from taxes on consumption (see Table 1).
For the United States, the ratio was 18 percent.
Many people believe that it is fairer to tax individuals on what
they take from society, rather than on what they contribute by
working and investing.
In the nineteenth century, classical
economist John Stuart Mill made this point in advocating the exemption of saving as part of a 'just" income tax system. In the
1940s, American economist Irving Fisher argued that the income tax
involved double taxation of saving and distorted the choice of individuals in favor of consumption. According to this view, not only is
the income tax unjust, it encourages consumption and leisure at the
expense of thrift and enterprise.
The U.S. Treasury actually proposed a "spendings tax" in 1942 as
a temporary wartime measure to curb inflation. The proposal was
quickly rejected by Congress. A major political argument against
the expenditures tax -- then and now -- is that the exemption of
saving would favor the rich who are better able to save large
portions of their incomes. Proponents of an expenditures tax respond that it can be made as steeply progressive as desired.
Moreover, the recent trend in income taxation in the United States
has been away from progressivity and toward a flatter, more
proportional revenue structure. The 1981 and 1986 tax acts are
striking cases in point. Another objection to the consumption base
is that it would favor the miser over the spendthrift, even when both
have similar spending power or ability to pay. The response offered
to this argument is that consumption uses up the resources available
to the nation, while work and saving add to these resources.
In practice, much of the impact of shifting to a consumption base
would depend on how the tax is structured. The two major alternatives are an expenditures tax levied on total purchases within an
accounting period and a value-added tax collected on each purchase.
Murray L. Weidenbaum is director of the Center for the Study of American
Business and Ernest S. Christian, Jr. is a partner in the Washington law firm
of Patton, Boggs and Blow. This report is adapted from a chapter in The
Value-Added Tax: Orthodoxy and New Thinking (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1989).
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Table 1

In theory, the base of the two taxes is the same -- the value of goods
and services purchased. The yields could be similar.

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX REVENUES IN
SELECTED COUNTRIES BY MAJOR SOURCE,
FISCAL YEAR 1985

Country

Austria
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
AVERAGE

Income
Taxes

54%
26
41
44
55

50
17
35
17
34
36
46

45
26
69
40
29
28

Social
Security
Taxes

Taxes on
Consumption

0%
32
33
13
4
9
44
36

35
15
35
30
25
44

0
21
26
42
25
32

33%
33
24
32
34

37
29
26
43
45
25
14
24
26
23
37
43
26
26
19

42
41
45
39
43

5

44

18
29

31
18

40%

26%

30%

Source: American Council for Capital Formation.
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All
Other

13%
9
2
11
7
4
10
3
5

6
4
10
6
4
8
2
2
4
7
8
6
12
10
4%

An Expenditures Tax
An expenditures tax would be collected in much the same manner as the income tax. The annual taxpayer return would continue
to be the heart of the collection system. Only one major change
would be made; the portion of income that is saved would, in effect,
be exempt from taxation.

Having so recently curtailed deductions for saving, it is
unlikely that Congress will reverse course and exempt
all saving by shifting to an expenditures tax.
For a while, the United States was moving toward an expenditures tax, albeit indirectly and in modest steps. The establishment of
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) enabled many federal taxpayers to defer paying taxes on amounts saved and invested in an
IRA (up to $2,000 a year). Also, the first $100 of dividends received
by a taxpayer was excluded from gross income. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986, however, greatly reduced the incentives for investing in
IRAs and eliminated the dividend exclusion. Having so recently
curtailed deductions for saving, it is unlikely that Congress will in
the near future reverse course and effectively exempt all saving by
shifting to an expenditures tax.

A Value-Added Tax
Attention has shifted to forms of national sales taxes, notably a
value-added tax. Such a consumption-based tax could be levied in
addition to the currently collected taxes (although substitutions are
possible). After having lain dormant for nearly a decade, interest in
a value-added tax in the United States has reemerged primarily
because of the conjunction of two economic factors -- budget and
trade deficits.
Sources of Revenue for Deficit Reduction
There are political and economic proponents of additional federal tax revenues who want to use such revenues for two inconsistent
policy objectives-- reducing the federal budget deficit and satisfying
3

pent-up demand for new or increased domestic spending programs.
Both pressures are well understood, although the latter is not spoken of in public very often.
Although less clearly understood, it is also likely the case that we
are. near the end of the era in which the income tax can provide
maJor new revenues to the federal government. As the result of recent tax reforms, primarily in 1986, the base of the income tax has
been broadened just about as much as is politically possible.
In~ome tax rates were drastically reduced in 1986 primarily as
the drrect result of a strong political force which is still at work.
High marginal rates of tax, which were born in a war-time era and
designe? to apply to the rich, w~re being applied to a broad range of
people m the newly affluent middle class who certainly do not consider themselves to be "rich." Having substantially reduced tax rates
twice in the 1980s, it will be exceedingly painful for the Congress to
rev~rse course and reimpose high rates of tax on income. The appetite for low tax rates was whetted, not satisfied, when the old idea
of steeply "progressive" rates was effectively discarded almost
without comment.
As a potential revenue raiser, the sheer size of a value-added tax
base is unequaled by the current income tax base or payroll tax base,
each of which has been severely limited by political judgments over
several decades. The value-added tax base roughly corresponds to
the tot.al output of goods and services in the economy plus imports
and mmus exports. For example, a comprehensive value-added tax
base in 1987 might have amounted to approximately $2.5 trillion. 1
That year a value-added tax of 3.5 percent on the comprehensive
base could have raised approximately the same revenue as the present corporate income tax with its generally applicable rate of 34
percent. A value-added tax of about 16 percent could have raised
about the same revenue as the present individual income tax which
applies 15 percent and 28 percent rates.

A firm's value-added is the difference between its sales and its
purchases from other firms. As shown in Table 2, value-added can
also be estimated by adding labor and capital inputs supplied by the
firm itself -- represented by wages and salaries, rent and interest
payments and profit.

In practice, the collection of the VAT may not be
as simple as it is in concept.

A variety of approaches has been suggested for collecting the
new tax. The most familiar is the invoice and credit method (see
Table 3). Under this approach, the tax is computed initially on a
company's total sales and the firm is given credit for the VAT paid
by its suppliers. To a substantial degree, the VAT would be selfenforcing.
In practice, the collection of the VAT may not be as simple as it
is in concept. That would be the case if certain transactions were
exempted (such as food) and if non-profit institutions and government enterprises were treated differently. Exemptions are no minor
matter in terms of the administrative complexity that they generate.
In France, a long and extensive debate occurred over whether or not
Head and Shoulders anti-dandruff shampoo was a medicine (taxexempt) or a cosmetic subject to the full VAT. Food eaten away
from the business at which it was purchased may be tax-exempt.
What happens if a McDonald's sets up tables outside of the
restaurant? 3

Computing a Value-Added Tax
.~ expenditures tax can be calculated via a "top down" approach,
buildmg on the records that are already available to provide the
data needed for enforcement of corporate and personal income
taxes. In contrast, a yalue-added tax (VAT) represents a very different way o~ ~ollectmg a general tax on consumption. It is, in
effect, a sophisticated and comprehensive sales tax which avoids the
double counting otherwise inevitable when the same item moves
from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer. In total a VAT should
be e'!uivalent in yield to a single-stage sales tax levi~d at the retail
level.

The "Business Transfer Tax" Proposal
While budget deficits and trade policy may increase the political
and economic interest in a value-added tax, the introduction in 1985
of the Business Transfer Tax (BTI) proposal by Senator William
Roth, a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, generated concerns that such taxes might not have the financial effects on
businesses and consumers which have long been assumed. The substance and structure of the proposed BTI attracted attention and in
some cases generated considerable alarm.
As a generic value-added tax computed by the basic subtraction
method (without the more familiar invoice and credit mechanisms),
the BTI raised some doubts about the traditional analysis of valueadded taxes. Could it be that consumption taxes in general -- or at
least this particular consumption tax -- might not be passed along in
full to consumers? Could ardent business proponents of consump-

4
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Table 3

Table 2

COMPUTING THE VAT USING THE CREDIT METHOD

TWO METHODS OF COMPUTING
VALUE ADDED IN PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION
Raw
Materials ManuProducer facturer

Item

Purchases of inputs
Value Added:
Wages
Rent
Interest
Profit
Total Value Added

10
10
20
$100

Sales of output

$100

Note:

$60

Wholesaler

Cumulative
Retailer Total

~

Raw Materials
Producer

Manufacturer

Wholesaler

Sales of output
Less purchases

$100
~

$500
-100

$800
-500

$1,000
-800

Value added

$100

$400

$300

$200

$10

- --

$50
-10

$80
-50

$100
-80

$10

$40

$30

$20

Item

$100

$500

$800

$1,400

$275
25
50
50

$100
50
25
25
$200

$635
125
110
130
$1,000

Tax on total sales
Credit on purchases

$400

$200
40
25
35
$300

$500

$800

$1,000

$2,400

Note: Assumes 10 percent VAT on a consumption basis.

Value added can be estimated in two ways:
(1) Deducting purchases from sales of output
($2,400 - $1,400 = $1,000) or,
(2) Adding inputs by the frrm itself (excluding inputs
supplied by others) ($635 + $125 + $110 + $130 = $1,000).

tion taxes find that they had actually been promoting a tax which
becomes just one more business cost rather than a tax that is borne
solely by consumers? Coupling the BTT proposal with the fact that
the Canadian government was also discussing a subtraction method
value-added tax at that time resulted in a period of substantive study
by business executives, as well as professional analysts, of the realworld effects of such taxes.

Pros and Cons of a VAT
Reasons for Favoring a Value-Added Tax
Proponents of a VAT contend that it is economically neutral,
because ideally it would be levied at a uniform rate on the entire
consumption base. It does not distort choices among products or
methods of production. Thus, shifting to more capital-intensive and
6

Tax liability

Retailer

perhaps more profitable methods of production does not influence
the tax burden. Nor is the allocation of resources across product
markets, and industry lines affected. In these regards, the VAT is
far superior to the existing array of selective excise taxes. In addition, advocates of a VAT point out that, in contrast to an income
tax, there is no penalty for efficiency and no subsidy for waste.
One argument in favor of the United States adopting a VAT is
that so many other nations have adopted this form of taxation. It
fits in better than other taxes with the growing international
character of production. The VAT has become one of the revenue
workhorses of the world. Virtually every important country in
Europe imposes the tax, and it has spread throughout the Third
World. 4 France has used value-added taxation since 1955, and other
members of the European Common Market have done so since the
late 1960s or early 1970s. Japan's 3 percent consumption tax will
take effect on April 1, 1989. If Canadian proposals to implement
income and sales tax reforms while enacting border-adjustable
value-added taxes are adopted, the United States will be left as the
only major industrialized democracy which does not utilize a tax system that allows imports to be taxed at the border and exports to
leave the country free of such tax.
At first blush, a VAT would seem to help reduce this nation's
7

presently large trade deficit. However, many economists believe
that fluctuations in exchange rates would largely offset these initial
effects and result in little change in the balance of trade.
Basis of Opposition
Opponents of a VAT offer an extensive list of shortcomings.
They contend that a VAT, like any consumption-based revenue
source, is inherently regressive. Those least able to pay face the
highest overall burdens. Such regressivity can be softened by removing food and medicine from the VAT base or by making refunds
to low-income taxpayers, but these variations make the collection of
the tax more complicated. It would also provide some opportunity
for people in the underground economy to avoid paying taxes. 5
Assuming a VAT is included in the price of purchases, it registers
in all of the price indices and, hence, exerts an inflationary force on
the economy. The counter-argument is that this is only a one-time
effect (occurring when the tax is enacted or increased). Also, the inflationary impact could be offset by appropriate changes in
monetary policy, albeit at times with an adverse effect on the levels
of production and employment. Opponents also charge that a VAT
would invade the area of sales taxation, traditionally reserved for
state and local governments.
Imposition of a VAT in the United States is said to require establishing a new tax collection system by the federal government and
new recordkeeping on the part of taxpayers. The Treasury Department, based on European experience, believes it would need 18
months after enactment to begin administering a VAT. 6

sumers and is, instead, a proportional tax on the output of labor and
the output of capital, will there be a boost to personal saving?
Would corporate saving be enhanced if this proportional tax on labor and capital were substituted for the corporate income tax, which
presumably is borne primarily by capital? Conversely, would the increase in the relative cost of labor prove to be a source of
regressivity, even if a value-added tax is not assumed to be passed
on to consumers?
The issue of taxing corporations versus taxing individuals takes
on a unique character when considering a value-added tax. In the
in~ome and payroll tax contexts, the corporation is the entity which
wntes the check to the government, and no effort is made to
allocate such taxes to individuals as shareholders or employees of
the corporate payors. But in a value-added context, the corporation
writes the check while individuals as consumers are assumed to be
bearing the burden. Why does this distinction exist?

The anticipated boost to personal saving resulting
from a value-added tax rests on the assumption
that such a tax is borne by consumers.

Any debate about value-added taxes quickly sparks renewed discussions of many long-standing, fundamental issues of tax policy
such as the saving rate in the United States by both individuals and
corporations, the relative burden of tax borne by capital and labor,
taxes on individuals versus taxes on corporations, the relative burden of tax on one type of business compared to another, and the
effects of the tax system on international trade. Affecting all of
these issues are two recurring questions. Who pays the tax? Who
bears the economic incidence?
For example, the anticipated boost to personal saving resulting
from a value-added tax rests on the assumption that such a tax is
borne by consumers and thus will make consumption relatively more
expensive than saving. But if the tax is not borne primarily by con-

Collecting certain taxes from corporations and then pretending
that such tax burdens are not actually borne by individuals (either as
shareholde~s, employees or consumers) is a lamentable political
pr~cess which should have been abandoned long ago. In an era in
which ~undreds of ~illions of dollars of individuals' pension funds,
IRAs, msurance policy assets and personal investments are in the
form of corporate stocks and bonds, it is difficult to understand the
argument that people are not bearing the cost of the tax on corporate profits. Perhaps a free-wheeling debate about the nature of the
relationship between incidence and payment of value-added taxes
could at least lead to similar considerations with respect to income
and payroll taxes.
There is a burgeoning concern within the business community
that a value-added tax may weigh more heavily on some lines of
business than others. Do these concerns arise because managers
see their businesses (i.e., their shareholders) as paying the tax or because they think that their customers would pay it?
The possibility of exempting certain goods from a value-added
tax presents the most stunning example of how important it is to
consider very carefully the question of who pays the tax and who
bears the economic incidence. Assume, for example, that the valueadded tax is a tax on producers of goods or services, comparable in

8
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Other Fundamental Issues

that respect to the present corporate income tax and payroll taxes.
If a value-added tax were substituted for present taxes and if certain
commodities such as food and medicine were exempted from tax,
the result would be essentially the same as exempting the producers
of those commodities from the corporate income tax and payroll tax.
How would that affect the flows of investments to, and the values of
stock in, taxable and nontaxable companies?
To the extent that international trade advantages can be obtained
by substituting a border-adjustable value-added tax for some existing
tax, any favorable change in the trade price of goods will depend
heavily on whether the value-added tax has the same or similar incidence as the tax it replaces. The presumption that a value-added tax
would have a favorable effect on trade does not mesh easily with the
presumption that such a tax is paid in full by consumers.

E~ch of these three alternatives would be accompanied by substantial burdens or costs, although they would differ from those
generated by the imposition of a consumption-based tax such as a
VAT. Reversal of the 1980s trend toward lower marginal income
tax r~tes would reduce the incentives to work, save, and invest. Substantial. furthe~ r~~uctions in ~ilitary and civilian spending might,
d~pend~g on m?IVI?ual value judgments, impair the achievement of
VIt~l na.ti?nal obJ~C~Ives --such as protecting the national security or
mamtammg the livmg standards of the elderly. Continued high levels of deficit spending would bring their own set of drawbacks
ranging from high real interest rates to upward pressure on the dol~
lar and thus on the foreign trade deficit.

Macroeconomic Effects

Taxpayers may prefer a low-rate VAT to the income tax if their
apparent attitude toward sales taxes is any indication. Yet, politiCiat;ts fear VAT because they fear it is regressive. Companies market~g consumer pro~ucts fear that the higher prices will reduce
the~ sales and p~ofits.
C_?nversely, companies selling capital
eq~npment and bus!-fless services tend to take a more sympathetic
~ttitude toward this form of government revenue, which would
lighten the tax burden on their customers and hence tend to expand their markets.
'
'
Some observers of national policymaking are reluctant to support
any new tax on the assumption that the added revenues would make
it ha.r?er for members of the Congress to turn down proposals for
ambitious ~~w. government spending programs. In their view, the
budget deficit likely would change little.

On the basis of expected 1990 levels of economic activity, a one
percent VAT would yield approximately $20-40 billion in federal
revenue (depending on the coverage of the tax). Thus, at a five percent rate, the VAT might virtually eliminate the $150 billion annual
deficit in the federal budget. Even with exemptions for food,
housing, and medical care, the estimated annual receipts from a five
percent VAT would be approximately $60 billion.
However, fiscal flows of such magnitude likely would generate a
variety of other impacts on the economy. For example, these estimates of the yield of the VAT assume that the Federal Reserve will
follow an accommodating monetary policy, with a somewhat inflationary effect.
Because the withdrawal of such a substantial amount of purchasing power would act as a depressant on the economy, a tax of
that magnitude likely would be phased in over a period of time.
One econometric analysis concludes that the economy would grow
about one percent more slowly for each percent of VAT and that inflation would be one and a half to two percent higher during an
initial adjustment period. 7
In policy terms, the institution of a VAT in the United States in
the 1990s should properly be viewed in contrast to likely alternatives:
• Increases in income tax rates;
• Reductions in general outlays for defense and entitlements; or
• Continued high levels of deficit financing.
10

Outlook

Selective Excise Taxes
Considerable support exists for a partial move toward federal
consumption or sales taxes, which would be accomplished by linking
the tax to an important policy objective. For example, some
propose an energy tax to help slow down the rising imports of oil. A
$5 a barrel oil import fee would raise about $17 billion in 1990. A
more ambitious measure to dampen energy demand -- a $5 a barrel
t~ .on ?omestic and imported oil-- would yield approximately $21
billion m the same year. One argument against such selective taxes
is that they dis~rim~ate against a single form of energy, petroleum.
~ co~prehensive .five ~e~cent tax on all domestic energy consumption, m contrast, IS anticipated to bring $16 billion a year into the
U.S. Treasury.
11

More modest tax proposals include raising the federal excise rate
on beer and wine to equal the rate on distilled spirits -- a $6 billion
revenue-raiser in 1990. Doubling the tax on cigarettes from 16 cents
to 32 cents a pack would yield $3 billion. Finally, linking the tobacco
and alcohol excises to the rate of inflation would increase Treasury
revenues $1 billion a year by 1990. Clearly, the federal government
does use selective sales taxes to raise revenue, although not to the
extent that state and local governments do. Nevertheless, the annual yield of federal excises is substantial. As shown in Table 4, this
form of taxation produced over $32 billion in revenue for the
Treasury in the fiscal year 1987.
Also, in the case of a comprehensive VAT, linkage to a popular
expenditure program would make passage more likely. Su~estions
include initiatives on education, health care, and investment.
Value-Added Tax as a Substitute
Although the current political interest in a value-added tax has
arisen primarily from its potential to raise revenues to reduce the
federal deficit, the substitution of a value-added tax for all or portions of existing income and payroll taxes is also a possibility. In
fact, the most recent proposals in the United States have explicitly
included such proposals.
In 1980, H.R. 7015 was introduced by Rep. Al Ullman. It provided for individual and corporate income tax rate reductions,
liberalized depreciation rules, expanded retirement savings provisions and reduced Social Security taxes, all of which were offset by a
10 percent tax applied to a moderately-narrow value-added base
(which excluded food, housing, medical care, farmers, fisherman,
mass transit, interest and exports).
In 1985, Senator William Roth introduced S. 1102, which called
for a credit against Social Security tax liabilities based on Business
Transfer Tax (BTT) liabilities under a five percent rate applied to a
base similar to the earlier Ullman proposal. The bill also included a
sense of the Senate provision which called for using the net BTT
revenues (after the Social Security credit) to reduce individual tax
rates and to provide increased individual saving incentives. In
February 1986, Senator Roth outlined explicit income tax rate reductions and investment-related provisions which would be funded
by revenues from an eight percent BTT (after the Social Security
credit) applied to a much broader base than his earlier proposal.
In 1986, Rep. Richard Schulze introduced H.R. 4598, which
called for repealing the corporate minimum tax and enhancing the
capital recovery provisions with revenues from a seven percent
Business Alternative Minimum Tax. Credits would be allowed
12

Table 4
REVENUE FROM FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES
Fiscal Year 1987

Source

Alcohol
Tobacco
Highway:
Gasoline
Diesel fuel
Tires, etc.
Subtotal
Airports and airways
Telephone
All other

Amount
(in billions)

Percent of total

$6.0

18%

4.8

15

8.7
2.8
1.8
13.3
3.0

2.5
2.9
$32.5

41
9
8

..2
100%

Source: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1989.

against the corporate income tax and Social Security liabilities.
Substitution of a value-added tax for some portion of existing
taxes seems a likely feature of any legislation for several reasons.
Politically, the process of enacting a new tax is all but certain to
require the building of a coalition from diverse interests. The "cost"
of blending such diversity could well include reductions in existing
income or payroll rates and/ or re-enactment of prior income tax
provisions which were repealed or restricted in 1986. Economically,
the incidence debate could produce pressures to compensate in
some way for the burdens of the new tax. It is interesting to speculate about the diversity of proposals which could arise -- payroll tax
cuts, low income credits, corporate rate cuts, capital formation
provisions -- depending on one's perspective.

Too Much Revenue: Is There Any Restraint?
The value-added tax is widely perceived as an almost unlimited
source of federal tax revenue. That is true only in the sense that a
13

relatively low rate of value-added tax -- compared to the present
high rates of corporate and individual income taxes -- would raise
substantial amounts, if applied to a comprehensive base. Despite
this theoretical revenue potential, there are obvious practical
restraints, not the least of which is the percentage of GNP that may
be extracted in taxes without stifling the economy.
Consider the possibility that Congress merely enacts a generic
value-added tax which is paid by the producers of goods or services
in proportion to the value that is added by each and that is understood to be the substantial equivalent of the present corporate
income tax and payroll tax. Having in mind that corporate income
taxes are already approximately one-third of corporate profits (as
computed for income tax purposes), is it realistic to suppose that
such a value-added tax would be imposed to extract another onethird or that the value-added tax rate might be increased another
percentage point or two so that the combination of corporate income tax and value-added tax payments would equal or exceed
corporate profits?

The short-tenn outlook is for a substantial increase
in the tax burden levied on private corporations.
Alternatively, assume that the popular view prevails and the
value-added tax is considered to be a tax on consumption. Two
commonly-voiced concerns would immediately come to the fore.
One is that the value-added tax is a "money machine" which can
readily be increased a percentage point or two almost unnoticed in
the general mix of price fluctuations, state sales taxes, etc. The
other concern is that any consumption tax is a major burden on consumers which may cause political revolt and could be enacted only
at great political danger to all incumbents. Both concerns are expressed by opponents, but it is difficult to see how both can be
correct.

The corporate tax increases in the 1986 law -- coupled with the
more modest revenue bills passed in 1982 and 1984 -- more than
offset the substantial corporate income cuts enacted in 1981 as part
of the supply-side Economic Recovery Tax Act. Total corporate income tax payments to the federal government in 1991 are estimated
to reach about $140 billion, or 40 percent more than they would
have been had the pre-1981 tax law remained in effect.
The impact of taxation on business is most uneven. Increasing
reliance on consumption taxes would likely hit consumer-oriented
companies particularly hard. However, a VAT would likely be a
lower burden on a highly profitable industry than a simple rate increase on corporate profits. In contrast, increasing excise taxes
selectively could wind up pitting one industry group against another,
with substantial incentive for businesses to use the political process
to achieve advantages or avoid disadvantages.
In short, the yawning federal deficit is reviving interest in another
round of tax "reform." Recent tax changes designed to be "revenue
neutral" have shifted the tax burden from the low-saving sector
(families and individuals) to high-saving sector (businesses). Some
form of VAT is thus likely to be debated and perhaps inaugurated in
the near future. The economic impacts of such a shift in the basis of
taxation must be carefully examined beforehand. Winners and
losers are unavoidable in any major tax change, but Congress should
obtain a clear understanding of its benefits and costs before embracing a major new revenue source.

Summary
In any event, the short-term outlook is for a substantial increase
in the tax burden levied by the federal government on private corporations. Specifically, as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
corporate income tax payments in 1990 are expected to reach approximately $130 billion -- double the 1986 total and more than
triple the amount collected by the Treasury in 1983.
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